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PELLE SUB AGNINA LATITAT MENS SAEPE LUPINA. 





The question of intellectual property and incentives for invention and creation is one that has 
arisen repeatedly in the history of economic thought
1
. However in recent decades it has 
developed in new directions that have attracted particular attention. More specifically, the 
formulation of the concept of innovation as a public good, introduced by Schumpeter (1943) 
and supported by the empirical findings of Solow (1957), launched a flourishing body of 
literature that has sought to justify intellectual property rights as an essential--though admittedly 
imperfect (Arrow, 1962)--tool for stimulating technological progress. The present contribution 
focuses on one specific type of intellectual property right, namely author's right or copyright 
(the two terms shall here be used synonymously
2




Nevertheless the application of economic analysis to copyright is important not just for the 
purposes of measuring economic flows, but also for evaluating how the right can influence the 
structure of the market, the behaviours adopted by economic agents and the resultant 
competitive outcomes. This, essentially, is the approach that has been taken in this article. 
In the following sections we shall focus in particular on the relationship between the right's 
aims of providing an incentive for creative activities, and the overall efficiency. It can in fact be 
shown that, even if the commodification of intellectual works by means of copyright does 
provide some incentive for creative activities, this benefit is offset by certain ‘side effects’ on 
the diversity and quality of the ideas produced, and interference with access to information and 
the incremental process of creation. All of which, if duly taken into account, can seriously call 
into question the overall balance of efficiency.   
In the present-day debate, the justifications given for copyright and author's rights invoke 
both considerations of economic efficiency, as well as ethics and rhetoric. However such 
arguments neglect to factor in the social costs, thus portraying in false light an institution that 
has, in practice, often served private interests very distant from its purported aims, injecting a Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
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significant amount of inefficiency into the economic system. This state of affairs can therefore 
be aptly summed up by the Latin adage of the title: “A wolf often lies concealed in the skin of a 
lamb". 
Nevertheless, the objections raised thus far, in the literature on the economic analysis of 
intellectual property rights, have inevitably resorted to the contraposition of extra-economic 
values, such as equity and justice, against those of economic efficiency. In the present 
discussion we shall seek to reconcile these two sides, showing how, under an expanded 
analytical perspective with respect to costs and benefits, and taking into consideration additional 
elements, copyright proves to be fundamentally inefficient even from a strictly economic 
standpoint, and that this will only be aggravated by technological progress
4
. We will therefore 
demonstrate that an examination of the dynamics of the right within the market and society can 
seriously call into question, or even entirely overturn, the traditional economic arguments in 
favour of copyright. 
2. The traditional law and economics analysis 
The standard justification for copyright (and intellectual property rights in general) is based 
essentially on the hypothesis that the legal institution emerged in response to a market failure, 
because in the absence of such a right individuals would not have an adequate incentive to 
undertake the creation of new (expressions of) ideas
5
. The argument sends back to the theory of 
public goods and externalities, which Coase (1960) resolved through the attribution of property 
rights to individuals. These, as the outcome of a negotiation between economic agents (and in 
the absence of subsequent public intervention) make it possible, at least in the original model, to 
achieve an optimal equilibrium in the Paretian sense
6
.  
The central assumption behind this approach is therefore that an appropriability problem 
exists which, in the absence of an adequate system of incentives, would result in a sub-optimal 
level of new ideas being produced
7
. In other words, the non-rival consumption and low marginal 
costs of dissemination/reproduction of copyrighted works, set against their high fixed 
production costs, leads to free-riding behaviours that have a negative impact on investments. 
Therefore, in the absence of an appropriate mechanism--i.e. provision for adequate incentives--
the above-described situation can, in the extreme case, produce adverse selection phenomena 
and drastically reduce the numbers of those who undertake creative activities
8
. 
The above is not a universally accepted view, and has been repeatedly challenged by various 
authors
9
. However this dissent has by and large been suppressed by the vigorous lobbying of 
copyright stakeholders--first and foremost among these the content-producing multinationals--
which has today prevailed in shaping the law making process (Christie, 1995; Ryan, 1998). Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
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In the final analysis, therefore, the most substantiated arguments in favour of intellectual 
property rights rest on the two-fold thesis of a legal monopoly as an "incentive to create" and/or 
as an "incentive to disclose".  
In the first case, the monopoly profits secured through the exclusive right are necessary for 
fuelling creative activities. In the second case, the temporary revenues from the exclusive right 
help stimulate the disclosure of new ideas that would otherwise, due to disinterest or fear of 
appropriation by others, fail to be disclosed (Audretsch, 1997). The static inefficiency arising 
from the intellectual property right monopolies is thus remedied through a dynamic efficiency, 
i.e. the creation an optimal level of new copyrightable works over time
10
. We note, however, 
that the public objective is not merely to promote the production of new expressions of ideas, 
but rather to attain a general enrichment of knowledge--which is by nature collective and public. 
And for this reason copyright is not an absolute right, but on the contrary limited in duration, 
and in certain cases subject to derogation (Gordon and Bone, 1999;  Bently and Sherman, 2001). 
The above-described position relies heavily on the assumption that intellectual property 
rights have virtuous effects on scientific and cultural development, but neglects to consider that  
“the familiar devices for protection of intellectual property are known to have a variety of 
untoward side-effects that may distort and even impede the progress of technology” (David, 
1993, p.17)
11
. These side-effects in fact influence the dynamic efficiency and substantially alter 
the final balance, as we shall see below.   
For now, it should be clear that the underlying premise invoked by supporters of intellectual 
property rights is that this system can achieve the goal of maximising the net social surplus, to 
produce an optimal quantity and quality of information. This point is crucial for the economic 
analysis of copyright. 
3. Incentives and value 
Upholders of intellectual property thus resolve the problem of the optimal production of a 
public good (information and knowledge in general) through its ex-lege transformation into a 
private good. This solution effectively rests upon the (by no means obvious) assumption that it 
is possible to reconcile the often dialectically opposed camps of private and the public interests. 
Only a careful and detailed analysis can reveal, for each particular case, whether these two 
spheres share any common ground that might enable them to enter into a virtuous relationship.  
3.1. Ideas and externalities 
From this perspective, the first question to address hinges on the conversion of intellectual 
works into commodities, i.e. their transfer from the cultural to the commercial sphere,  a Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
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metamorphosis that underpins the functioning of the market. However this transition implies a 
difficult reconciliation between the ‘use-value’ that society attributes to cultural products
12
 and 
their ‘exchange-value’ as defined by the market
13
. This rift, which naturally also applies to 
objects other than ideas, becomes especially significant in the case of  copyrightable works 
which, by virtue of belonging to the knowledge and information sphere, are inherently 
appurtenant to collective contexts. An idea cannot be attributed an exchange-value if it is devoid 
of use-value for a community; and, an anthropologist would say, it will have use-value for a 




The peculiarity of intellectual property, as compared with conventional property, lies 
precisely in the fact that categories of the physical, measurable and divisible world are applied 
to the sphere of culture and knowledge, where boundaries and quantities are to some extent a 
legal artifice, and hence open to discussion.  In fact, the margin of separation between one 
copyrightable work and another (unlike that separating tangible objects), is fuzzy and arbitrary; 
already in the 19th century, the English scholar Augustine Birrell noted that, while it is easy to 
draw the boundaries of a physical asset, it is altogether more arduous to determine how much a 
book truly belongs to an author, because any creative endeavour contracts a significant and 
indissoluble debt with its precursors, and with the context in which it is generated (Goldstein, 
1994). 
The use-value of an intellectual work is inevitably based on its semiotic content, which in its 
turn is inherently social in character
15
:  the form of the idea, i.e. its fixing in a tangible medium, 
will have an exchange-value due to the fact that it conveys shared symbols, in other words a 
use-value. And in fact the institution of the right by the political authorities is motivated by use-
value: the recurrent refrain being that ideas are socially desirable, but that in the absence of 
copyright they would be created--and disclosed--in suboptimal quantities, to the detriment of 
society.  
However it is the exchange-value that underpins the incentive, and makes the attribution of 
exclusive economic exploitation rights attractive to an individual: in the marketplace, ownership 
of an idea is meaningful only when its exchange-value is high, i.e. when the legal monopoly 
translates into (or approximates) an economic monopoly
16
. So, the theory of intellectual 
property rights implicitly assumes that exchange-value--whose sphere of action is the market--
can provide an incentive for the creation of use-value--whose sphere of action is society. This is 
patently not a neutral assumption, unless one admits an equivalence or perfect correlation 
between the use-value and exchange-value of an idea, which is by no means true in practice.  
An additional consideration on this point: from an economist's perspective the situation 
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externality, with respect to the output of a production process, which in our case is the 
exchange-value. Now the dilemma of policymakers lies precisely in the peculiarity that the 
objective being targeted is the externality, whereas the stimulus is exerted on the output, which 
in the intellectual property right model furnishes the sole effective incentive for creators. 
Therefore, if we assume a highly variable distribution of externalities between different 
copyrightable works, the incentive for any one particular output does not guarantee that an 
optimal amount of externalities will nevertheless be produced
17
.  On the other hand it can be 
dangerous to rely on the market for the stimulation and selection of ideas, because this entrusts 
the incentive exclusively to profit--i.e. to a  purely economic dimension that precludes any 
broader set of values. A mechanism of this type, that is only weakly aligned with its general 
objectives, can therefore produce results very much at odds with those for which the right was 
originally instituted.  
In the case of patents, one can sometimes posit a degree of correlation between profits and 
the social value of ideas. However the claim that a particular development is the one that 
produces maximum welfare remains unproven, because there is generally  no opportunity to 
make comparisons between alternative paths. On the contrary, a rich body of literature has 
shown that successful ideas can crowd out others due to the so-called ‘increasing returns of 
adoption’ (Arthur, 1988 and 1989), which tend to direct the course of subsequent developments 
(Foray, 1989). And in cases where a comparison can be made, it emerges that the outcome of 
the innovation race is not always the best one, because historical accident, demand-side network 
externalities, issues of compatibility with preceding standards and path-dependence can ordain 
the success of ideas that are actually inferior to competing ones (David, 1985 and Arthur, 1988).  
In the case of copyrightable works, the question is even more vexed because their cultural 
and social value hinges on complex phenomena, in which the role of the market is relatively 
recent and not yet fully understood. We can be justified in saying, though, that its pure profit-
orientation makes the market ill-equipped to handle non economic variables connected with the 
wider social context--unless one is prepared to accept a questionable equivalence between 
market and society.  Therefore, the only guaranteed effect of the monopoly created by copyright 
is that it attributes an exchange-value to the intellectual work, i.e. assigns it a market price. 
However this market price may be only marginally correlated with its possibly high use-value, 
or diverge from it completely.  
3.2. Effects on creative activities 
What can happen, on the other hand, is that the economic nature of the marketplace will 
mainly stimulate the creation of ideas geared to the profit maximisation objective, i.e. those with 
a high exchange-value, even if their use-value is questionable, while neglecting those ideas Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
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whose use-value cannot be fully ‘comprehended’ by the exchange-value. The proliferation of 




What is more, the commercial rationale that favours the types of products most successful on 
the market will drive creative activities to converge toward the subset of ideas that promise 
greatest profits, with a general impoverishment of knowledge also in terms of diversity. It has 
already been documented, in the field of technological innovation, that from a social standpoint 
there is an excess of correlation between different R&D policies (Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 
1986).  
In the case of copyright, to borrow a definition from communication theory, we can speak of 
‘semiological reduction’ (Baudrillars, 1972): the processes set in motion by the market trigger a 
dynamic which favours the emergence of particular types of ideas, i.e. those that are better 
equipped to answer the economic objectives. For example a strategy of risk minimisation will 
tend to move in this direction, because the uncertainty associated with preferences, and 
therefore with demand, will favour the production of similar ideas, i.e. those clustered around 
the taste currently in vogue.   
Once again, the thesis is corroborated by the sociological literature which--starting with the 
seminal work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1947)--in fact denounces the products of cultural 
industries, pointing out their tendency to flatten out knowledge, creating a sort of pseudo-
individuality which, behind an outward facade of minimal originality, in reality only bolsters 
conformity. 
It is also reasonable to assume that, with respect to their use-value, intellectual works answer 
purposes that are not exclusively economic, but which fulfil the personal and collective utility 
functions of both their consumers and creators in a variety of ways
19
. As a consequence, the 
implicit assumption that individuals undertake the creation of ideas primarily to secure revenues 
is not only unproven, but widely contradicted by the anthropological, ethnographic, historical 
and even scientific literature (Dasgupta and David, 1994). In fact the arts, in their most disparate 
forms, have always existed in a variety of cultural contexts (David and Foray, 2002). This might 
prompt the objection that, precisely because creative activities are so deeply rooted in human 
nature and collective contexts, the continued creation of ideas with high use-value would 
nevertheless be assured, irrespective of the positive or negative effects of the market. 
In response to this it should be pointed out that, over the long term, copyright mechanisms 
will have an impact even in this sphere. In fact, by favouring ideas that maximise expected 
profits, and transforming their beneficiaries into consumers, the right will also tend to alter the 
behaviours of both creators and consumers. As the market comes to prevail, the former may 
become more aware of, and influenced by, financial considerations, while the latter, continually Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
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exposed to market signals expounding the importance of intellectual works with high use-value, 
might alter their preferences accordingly
20
. This question has been explicitly investigated in the 
social sciences, where individuals have repeatedly been shown to be culturally ‘malleable’ 
(Marcel Mauss, 1979).  
Consumers might also interpret the market success of products with high exchange-value as 
an indication of their high use-value, thereby generating a sort of ex-post equilibrium in which 
use-value and exchange-value coincide: however this is really only a consequence of the 
conditions artificially created by copyright. The described dynamic can ultimately lead to an 
opposite selection to that feared by supporters of intellectual property rights: only ideas with a 
high exchange-value are created, and these crowd out traditional preferences through the above-
described mechanism.  
4. Authors versus owners: the metamorphosis of the incentive 
Another peculiar attribute of copyright, that sets it apart from other intellectual property 
rights, concerns the separation between the sphere of authorship, which defines creative 
proprietorship, and that of ownership, which defines economic proprietorship. This (by no 
means self-evident) distinction injects ambiguity into the market of copyrighted works, by 
casting doubt, as we shall see, not just on the efficiency of the right, but also (once again) on the 
consistency between its stated ends and the means of achieving them.  
The above distinction occurs in every copyright law, where all the national variants (though 
admittedly with differences in interpretation from country to country) break up the right into 
two components, moral rights and economic rights, which are treated as distinct entities and 
applied in different contexts (Metaxas-Maranghidis, 1995; Bently and Sherman, 2001).  
The standard explanation for this division states that the purpose of moral rights is to protect 
authorship, that is to say the intimate bond between an author and his work, as a result of which 
they fall under the scope of natural rights, which are inalienable
21
.
 By so doing the legislators 
have sought to acknowledge and protect the extra-economic significance of creative activities. 
Pecuniary rights, on the other hand, protect ownership, i.e. the rights of economic exploitation 
of an intellectual work, and are perfectly alienable
22
.  
Note that the intention of the legislation is that moral rights should temper the exploitation of 
pecuniary rights, in order to safeguard aspects that the latter are unable t o protect. This, 
implicitly accepts the thesis that creative activities extend into spheres that the market is not 
always able to reach. 
In any case, there is lively debate in the juridical literature on the role and applications of 





. Although these aspects are marginal for the purposes of this analysis, 
they contain an interesting parallel with the previously mentioned causal relation of exchange-
value to use-value. In fact here we have ownership (which gives the owner, or licence holder, 
the exclusive right to duplicate and sell the intellectual work) being granted to stimulate 
authorship.  In other words, although the economic activity hinges on ownership, the profits 
which it secures for the holder of the right are intended to stimulate the creation of new 
copyrightable works--in essence new authorships.   
So once again we see that the economic and creative dimensions, though theoretically 
distinct, are in practice placed on an equal footing, with the former being causal to the second. 
There have already been doubts expressed as to the validity of this position. But even setting 
this ambivalence aside, and assuming the incentive to be valid, the possibility of alienating 
economic rights raises serious questions as to the robustness of the mechanism: if authors, for 
whatever reason, are not the beneficiaries of the profits derived from the exploitation of their 
ideas, the incentive provided by copyright might not work.  
Now it is reasonable to assume that creators generally operate outside the market, or at any 
rate that they are not perfectly informed about it, whereas their opposite numbers (publishers, 
record labels etc.) are as a rule better informed about the economic mechanisms, and therefore 
able to assign a specific probability distribution to the eventual 'success' of an intellectual work. 
What emerges, therefore, is a situation of asymmetric information, with creators at a 
disadvantage, that could potentially compromise the correct functioning of the incentive. In fact, 
because creators lack the adequate analytical tools, they are not in a position to calculate the real 
profits and might consequently undersell their rights. In such a case, the reward mechanism of 
copyright would fail to function (or do so in a distorted manner, attributing the profits to the 
wrong subjects), with the social costs of the monopoly still being incurred despite the prior 
alienation of the economic rights. Nor can we attribute any great significance to the 
inalienability and perpetual ownership of moral rights, because these cannot bring in economic 
benefits under the law. 
It would therefore seem more logical, in pursuing the institutional objectives of intellectual 
property rights under conditions of uncertainty, to strengthen the position of authors--who are 
the weaker party in the negotiation--for example by allowing for the periodic renegotiation of 
transferred economic rights, which are the primary incentive of copyright. Such a clause might 
help correct the informational asymmetry that currently favours licence-holders, ensuring that 




The above is indirectly backed up by the historical record: copyright and author's right were 
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namely to protect the right to duplicate and sell copies of an idea, under a “utilitarian calculus 
that balances the needs of copyright producers [i.e., the publishers] against the needs of 
copyright consumers, a calculus that appears to leave authors at the margins of its equation” 
(Goldstein, 1996, pp. 168-169)
25
.  
The present day reappraisal of moral rights, which on the one hand offers a more solemn and 
almost ethical justification for copyright (all to the benefit of stakeholders, and very rarely of the 
authors), on the other hand reflects a certain reluctance, on the part of legislators, to treat 
copyright as a purely economic matter
26
. In any case, the fact that the moral rights of authors (or 
their heirs) are exercised chiefly outside the market--because monetary claims cannot be 
advanced on the basis of moral rights--puts their effectiveness and, as mentioned previously, 
their true significance, very much in doubt. 
5. The right and the market: a dialectical relationship 
A rapid overview of the competitive dynamics can further contribute to an economic analysis 
of copyright, its workings on the market and the outcomes in terms of efficiency. In effect, the 
majority of the literature on this subject focuses on a static analysis of the market of ideas, and 
therefore treats the right as an instrument ‘within the market’: given a particular set of initial 
conditions, either with or without an  ex-lege monopoly, equilibria are identified and the 
outcomes in terms of welfare are compared. This exercise in comparative statics therefore 
assumes that there exists an unchanging market to which the different systems can be applied, in 
order to add up the various profits and consumer surpluses and compute the resultant social 
welfare outcomes (Landes and Posner, 1989). 
It does not, however, take into account the dynamic effects of the right on the behaviours of 
economic agents and on the market structure itself, and the not negligible fact that it gradually 
alters the scenario under study. 
5.1. Market structure and rational behaviours 
The effects of copyright are not limited, ceteris paribus, to averting market failure, because it 
also progressively alters the structure of the market and behaviours, producing outcomes that are 
inconsistent, and often widely at variance, with its purported aims. For example, some observers 
(OECD, 1995; Fels, 1994) have noted that, in the recording, publishing and software industries 
(but also in chemicals and pharmaceuticals), firms have repeatedly leveraged their exclusive 
intellectual property rights to elevate trade barriers against parallel imports, with the clear aim 
of pursuing international price discrimination. In the case in point it was observed that (OECD, 
1995, par. 5 and par.2) -“[…] the copyright law goes further than correcting that market failure Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
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in also restricting the distribution of a copyrighted product, validly on the market consistent 
with copyright law in its country of origin” and there are “[…] two possible explanations for 
this state of affairs, that regulation [in imports] is in the public interest or that legislature has 
been “captured” by producers of copyrighted material”.  
In the above-described situation intellectual property rights have thus been shown to promote 
anti-competitive behaviours, with the obvious negative repercussions on collective welfare. This 
is on no account a paradoxical phenomenon, and has a very simple explanation:  because 
copyright attributes de facto market power, it is rational for owners to seek to exploit this to the 
full, for example by practicing international price discrimination designed to extract maximum 
surpluses from consumers, even if this clearly undermines the welfare-enhancing purpose of the 
law. And yet in economic terms, from the perspective of the copyright owner, such behaviours 
are perfectly rational--and in the majority of cases legitimate (Ramello, 2003). 
What is more, the economic theory of rent-seeking tells us that incumbent monopoly-holders 
will generally have a rational tendency to make unproductive investments directed at 
maintaining their dominant position: an activity that “ destroys value by wasting valuable 
resources” ”(Tollison and Congleton, 1995, p. xii).  The limiting case, in this respect, would be 
that where the rent-seeker dissipates all the monopoly revenues
27
. Such an outcome is clearly at 
odds with the efficiency objectives of the intellectual property legislation.  
5.2. The dilemma of competition 
The points described thus far paint an ambiguous picture: because copyright is an exclusive 
right, it injects a monopolistic drift into the market that will be more or less pronounced 
depending on the market power that the owner is able to command (Ramello 2003). This drift 
may blur the existing margins between competitive and anticompetitive behaviours, and is 
clearly a source of inefficiency. 
The analysis takes its cue from the controversial Magill case, and from the more recent 
IMS
28
. In both suits, the exclusive rights granted under copyright were in fact judged to be 
illegitimate under the antitrust laws, because they had the effect of barring potential competitors 
from the market. Now, from an economic perspective the question is contradictory: if we accept 
the rationality hypothesis, then within any given regulatory framework behaviours will be 
consistent with the profit-maximisation objective. Therefore, if an individual is granted a legal 
monopoly, it is perfectly rational for him to seek to translate it into an economic monopoly, and 
to endeavour to retain it. This behaviour will be anticompetitive only to the same extent that the 
copyright law itself is--in practice, albeit not in its original intention--anticompetitive. For goods 
that are sufficiently differentiated and poorly interchangeable (such as ideas), ownership of an 
exclusive right does in fact result in a monopoly, because it restricts access to a fundamental Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
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input. It would therefore be irrational to expect copyright holders to behave in a manner 
inconsistent with this framework.  
And in fact, if we can say that copyrightable works in many cases have a naturally imperfect 
interchangeability (because every idea is in some way different from the others), it becomes 
rational for owners to pursue a strategy of accentuating this attribute, by widening the real or 
perceived distinction between competing products. This approach, of shifting competition onto 
non-price elements, is manifestly aimed at attenuating price competition, and will have a 
correspondingly anticompetitive effect, with the attendant inefficiency
29
. 
The tools for pursuing the above strategy are provided by the mass media, which are able at 
the same time to reach vast audiences repeatedly exposing ideas until they become universal 
signs, and to make every cultural product unique and non-interchangeable. Through the 
combined workings of these economic and technological mechanisms, the uptake of an idea 
becomes increasingly equated with its market success. Thus, thanks to the communication 
media, exchange-value becomes causal with respect to use-value. 
In other words, the market success and relentless media exposure of an idea trigger a self 
enforcing mechanism that tends to augment its uniqueness and desirability. The result is a sort 
of ‘perceived quality’ or ‘perceived uniqueness’ in the eyes of consumers, that increases roughly 
in direct proportion with notoriety and success.  
So that, ultimately, the logic of the market  drives toward ever increasing (unproductive) 
investments aimed at affecting this factor: for example high expenditure on marketing and 
special effects, huge sums paid to artists, entertainers, actors, etc.  All this can increase the 
quality and uniqueness  perceived by consumers, the rigidity of demand and, ultimately, the 
volume of revenues. However these types of investments are a move in the direction of rent-
seeking behaviours, which makes them, at least to some extent, anticompetitive and inefficient. 
The competitive game between copyrighted works is essentially played out on the definition 
of their quality and uniqueness as it is perceived by consumers, which can at times be artificially 
enhanced or even artificially constructed. This sets in motion a s ort of recursive, positive-
feedback mechanism between exchange-value and use-value, that ultimately serves to maximise 
the profits of producers, with the additional consequence of aggravating the net loss due to 
monopoly (Silva and Ramello, 2000).  
What is more, this mechanism shifts the industrial configuration toward a so-called ‘winner-
takes-all’ market model (Frank and Cook, 1995): the investments sunk for differentiating 
products become more and more like purchasing a lottery ticket, with an increasingly slender 
chance of winning an ever bigger jackpot
30
.  
We therefore have, on the one hand, high expected profits for a few players which tend to 
skew expectations, attracting an above-optimal number of individuals and investments, with a Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
 
12 
resultant waste of resources; and on the other hand a rewards system that marks a sharp division 
between winners and losers, where in reality a continuous quality spectrum exists (Frank and 
Cook, 1995). So that, as a result of this market structure, ideas that are only marginally inferior 
to the winners in terms of quality will fail to succeed.  
A dynamic such as this impoverishes both society and cultural diversity. And most 
importantly, it by no means guarantees the correct functioning of the incentive to create: “[…] 
in an economy permeated by these markets, there can be no general presumption that private 
market incentives translate self-interested behaviour into socially efficient outcomes” (Frank 
and Cook, 1995, p. 20).  
This once again confirms the hypothesis of the dynamic effects of the right on the market 
structure. The lottery logic in fact drives incumbents to pursue behaviours aimed at increasing 
their likelihood of winning, by elevating barriers to entry that limit the number of possible 
competitors-winners and acquiring a large number of ‘tickets’. Both behaviours are essentially 
an updated version of the dissipation of monopoly quasi-rents. In the first case, there is an 
endogenous escalation of certain costs (e.g. marketing, distribution and even production 
expenditure, as in the case of expensive special effects or high salaries for actors, etc.), which 




In the second case, high diversification and the accumulation of large catalogues of 
copyrighted works increases the likelihood of winning, under the rationale of minimising risk 
(Ramello, 2003). Overall, however, the described dynamic consolidates the position of 
incumbents and further restricts competition, gradually increasing the concentration of 
industries, as has been confirmed by surveys of specific sectors
32
.  
The situation therefore favours the emergence of players with strong market power, further 
enhanced through the continual acquisition of complementary sectors in the fields of 
information, entertainment and communications. The optimal strategy has been eloquently 
described by the former president of a large industrial conglomerate: “When power is moving 
between different bits of the v alue chain, you need to own the whole chain” (Anonymous, 
1998).  
6. Structure of copyright and its objectives 
To further evaluate the impact of copyright on the market, it is necessary to analyse its 
structure: in fact, an efficient incentive needs to have a particular architecture. In the case in 
point, this requires proper handling of the instrumental variables involved:  deciding what to 
protect (the ‘scope’ of the right) and for how long to protect it (the ‘duration’ of the right) are Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
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fundamental decisions in the design of the incentive mechanism. An exaggerated level of 
protection could cause excessive losses in terms of social welfare, and even compromise 
innovation by blocking the cumulative creation process (Scotchmer 1998, David 1993). On the 
other hand a form of protection that is too weak, according to the standard approach, could lead 
to market failure. 
6.1. Consistency of the incentive 
The reference value, as emerges from the economic literature on patents, is the costs that are 
incurred in creation: because the incentive is necessary for recouping these costs, it must be 
calibrated on this basis (Scotchmer, 1998). Assuming therefore that a creator acts as an agent of 
the society, the incentive will have to satisfy the usual participation and compatibility 
constraints, which are strictly dependent upon costs
33
.  However copyright fails to take these 
aspects into account, and provides structurally equivalent protection to a multitude of different 
ideas that all have different creation costs. As a consequence, it seems doubtful that it can 
correctly function as an incentive.  
A much more likely situation in this scenario is that some producers of inefficient ideas will 
nevertheless receive an incentive, but that (because only successful copyrighted works cover the 
costs incurred) negative expectations will later arise, leading to subsequently lower investments 
on the part of those who fail to achieve market success after a certain amount of time
34
. This 
could be equally detrimental to those creative activities that require a longer time period to 
become successful.  
Finally, only a right that is diversified according to creative domains and types of ideas can 
efficiently balance the needs of creators, who are given an incentive by the right, with those of 
consumers, who are rationed by the right
35
. However in the domain of copyright equal 
protection is given to a vast assortment of ideas which do not all, or not in equal measure, 
contribute to the welfare function. We are therefore justified in asking, once again, to what 
extent such a blind mechanism is effectively able to protect collective interests. 
6.2. Scope 
Looking at the individual instrumental variables, the scope and duration of the right, there 
are other questions that arise. It is a commonly held view that, in the case of copyright, the first 
variable is negligible, because--it is claimed--the right does not protect ideas in the abstract but 
only their expression, i.e. fixing in a tangible medium, and hence the scope is determined by this 
same fixing
36
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In reality, this assertion can be challenged in a number of ways and takes a rather short-
sighted view of creative processes. Some authors (Jones, 1990, p. 552 and 552) argue that the 
conceptual dichotomy may be sterile: “ no <<expressionless idea>>   exists” because “any 
<<idea>> must necessarily have an expression”. In addition, the “ distinction between the terms 
<<idea>> and <<expression>> cannot serve as a fundamental determinant for deciding what is 
protectible under copyright law” (Jones, 1990, p.552). And, in fact, the scope depends on the 
law which defines what constitutes the subject matter. Consider in this respect the case of a 
musical piece: legislators generally give most importance to the melody, permitting third parties 
to imitate the orchestration, arrangements, and so forth, even though these are clearly 
identifiable elements that account for a substantial--or even prominent--part of the 
compositional effort
37
. Strictly speaking, in fact, the decision to protect one specific element 
rather than another will have consequences on what is created, due to the clear demarcation that 
is made between what can and cannot be copied. 
Another aspect also needs to be considered: the extension of copyright to the most disparate 
contexts has, in terms  of competition, had a similar effect to the extension of scope in the 
domain of patents. If the incentive of a patent depends on what is understood by the definition 
of ‘idea’--which delimits the bounds of the monopoly
38
 --the incentive of copyright depends on 
what we accept to be an ‘expression of an idea’. In the above-mentioned Magill and IMS cases, 
for example, the extension of copyright to objects that have little or no bearing on creativity, 
such as a television listing or a database, while it might provide a perhaps modest incentive to 
create, also encourages behaviours detrimental to competition.   
6.3. Duration 
An examination of the second instrumental variable, the duration of the right raises further 
questions as to the efficiency of the institution. Even if we accept, for simplicity’s sake, that 
scope is of little importance in the copyright case, this is all the more reason for duration to 
become the crucial variable through which legislators balance out the trade-off between private 
incentive and collective welfare.  
A correct duration, under the logic of incentive, is that which grants creators revenues at 
least equal to the costs incurred, and this value needs to be determined on a case by case basis. 
In general, though, the time horizon should  always be defined in a manner that permits 
calculation of the correct expected profits, while the attribution of a long post mortem autoris 
term (PMA), which shifts the duration well beyond the lifetime of the creator, remains a 
dubious proposition. 
In effect in the EU the duration can be as high as 70 years PMA (Duration Directive 
93/98/EEC)--exceeding the already substantial 50 year term set by the Berne Convention--while Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
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in the US the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA, 1998) has extended the duration to 70 
years PMA for private individuals, or to 95 years if the owner of the right is a firm. Now these 
durations make it rather difficult to compute the expected benefits, so that there is a danger of 
merely extending the quasi-rents to the detriment of market efficiency. In particular, there is the 
risk of hampering incremental creative activities whose access to knowledge will be rationed by 
a very long duration
39
, whereas accomplishing the ultimate aim of copyright--namely the 
creation of new knowledge accessible to society through provision of a temporary private 
benefit--would require minimising this exclusion effect which should certainly not extend 
beyond the creator's lifetime. 
Moreover, the trivial assertion that “that a longer term of protection is necessary  for them 
[copyright owners] to recoup their original financial outlay ”(Antill and Coles, 1996, p. 380) is 
unacceptable, because firms and managers rarely calculate even their longest term investments 
over such extended time horizons.  
In short, t he necessity of assuring revenues over such a protracted time period (nearly 
perpetual from the perspective of economic agents) finds no support in the economic theory, but 
can instead be plausibly explained as a successful capture of law-making processes by economic 
interest groups, who have in this way, aided and abetted by the authorities, effecting a full-
fledged and permanent expropriation of public goods (i.e. knowledge) from society, with the ill-
concealed aim of creating solid intangible assets for themselves (David, 2000, Ryan 1998). The 
clear consequences of this operation, which has little to do with the authors themselves (or with 
their heirs), are an increased cost to society, wasted resources (through the dissipation of quasi-
rents) that could  otherwise be used elsewhere, restriction of access to information, and 
impoverishment of the cultural domain. 
7. Regulatory process and ‘capture’ 
The issue of interference on the part of economic stakeholders requires at least a brief 
digression. The ostensible goal of copyright and author's right is to increase knowledge by 
providing an incentive to creators. From a historical perspective, though, we find that the 
sources of the laws are very different: the right originated as a privilege granted to publishers, 
and was often used by governments as a tool for controlling what was published (Goldstein 
1994, Patterson, 1968). Subsequently various attempts were made to introduce corrections 
favouring authors, but powerful interest groups have continued to exert considerable influence 
over its evolution.  
Moving on to recent times, we find that the national and international law-making processes 
have been at the very least distorted, if not steered wholesale, by intensive lobbying campaigns 
of economic interest groups and the resultant political pressures exerted by certain governments.  Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
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The most active nation in this respect has been the United States (the leading exporter of 
intellectual property), which through its US Trade Representative has, beginning in the mid 
1980s, insisted on incorporating into GATT specific agreements relating to intellectual property 
(Ryan 1998). In this connection, Christie (1995, p.527) asserts in no uncertain terms that “ the 
US obsession with obtaining ‘international harmonisation’ of intellectual property laws […] in 
real terms means the adoption of law satisfactory to the interests of US enterprises” 
Irrespective of opinion on this matter, the pressures exerted led to the 1994 drafting and 
ratification, in Marrakesh, of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs). This has had a considerable impact on the national laws, first and foremost 
among these those of the European Community, further stimulated by the concomitant pressures 
of economic interest groups. Antill and Coles (1996, p.379) have underlined its role: “A 
protracted period of lobbying and industry investigation culminated on 20 November 1995 with 
the laying before Parliament of a draft Statutory Instrument entitled ‘The Duration of Copyright 
and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995’. This Statutory Instrument amends the existing 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) and implements into national law the EC 
Directive 93/98 EEC, colloquially known as the ‘Duration Directive’”.  
What emerges, therefore, is a clear impression, backed by a growing number of observers 
(Christie, 1995; Altbach, 1996; Ryan, 1998; Lessig, 2001), that the evolution of copyright laws 
is today determined by a complex dynamic, in which the pressures of special interest groups 
play a significant and prominent role. So it is unlikely that the development of these laws, 
driven by political negotiation, can best serve the public objectives of the right, and the goal of 
efficiency. 
8. Conclusions 
The stated objective of copyright relates to the public domain: the production of new 
knowledge through the private stimulation of creativity. Even if the resultant commodification 
of ideas, bolstered by the ex-lege monopolies, does encourage creative activities, it also has 
various other consequences. First of all, it can influence the types of ideas that are produced, 
and limit their diversity. Secondly, it can favour rent-seeking economic behaviours which have 
a negative impact on efficiency. Finally, due to its peculiar structure, it does not fully answer the 
logic of incentive and can produce results very different from those intended, and which are not 
necessarily efficient. 
Copyright does have the obvious but crucial effect of rationing demand, so that a 
considerable portion of potential consumers are excluded through price selection, with a 
detrimental effect on incremental knowledge creation. This exclusion effect should in theory be 
minimal--only in order to give a reward to creators for their contribution to society--whereas Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
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under the present structure of the right it is excessive. And the current regulatory trend is toward 
further augmenting it.  In fact the recent history of copyright protection laws has shown that this 
often indiscriminate extension is a response to powerful lobbying forces, which by their very 
nature serve private interests.  
What is more, sector surveys have detected, over the past few decades, an increasing 
concentration of intangible assets in the hands of a limited number of subjects, who are gaining 
more and more control over creative activities and the dissemination of knowledge. This 
concentration, as we know from industrial economics, can interfere both with competition and 
with innovative processes.  
Summing up, therefore, copyright today does not seem able to pursue the public goals that 
justify its existence, although it certainly does succeed in serving private interests. The former 
are, at best, manipulated in order to achieve the latter. This, essentially, is the message of the 
Latin motto of the title.  




Adorno T. e Horkheimer M. (1947, edition 1979), Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, London.  
Altbach P.G. (1996), ‘The Subtle Inequalities of Copyright’,The Acquisitions Librarian, 15, 17-
26. 
Anonymous (1998), ‘Wheel of F ortune. A Survey of Technology and Entertainment’,  The 
Economist, November 21
st, 1-21. 
Antill J. e Coles P. (1996), ‘Copyright Duration: The European Community Adopts ‘Threee 
Score Years and Ten’, European Intellectual Property Review, 18, 379-383. 
Arrow K .J. (1962), ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
Nelson R.R.(ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Arthur W. B. (1988), “Competing technologies: an overview”, in Dosi G.  et al. (a cura di), 
Technical change and economic theory, Pinter. 
— (1989), “Competing technologies, increasing returns and lock-in by historical events”, 
Economic Journal, 99, 116-131.  
Audretsch D.B. (1997), ‘Technological Regimes, Industrial Demography and the Evolution of 
Industrial Structures’, Industrial  and Corporate Change, 6, 1, 49-81. 
Baudrilllard J. (1972), Pour une critique de l’économie politique du signe, Gallimard, Paris.   
Bently L. and Sherman B. (2001), Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University Press. 
Besen S.M. (1998), ‘Intellectual Property’, in Newman P. (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, London.  
Bhattacharya S. e Mookherjee D., (1986), ‘Portfolio Choice in Research and Development’, 
Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 594-605. 
Christie A. (1995), ‘Reconceptualising Copyright in the Digital Era’,  European Intellectual 
Property Review, 11, 522-530. 
Coase R. (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44. 
Dasgupta P. and David P. (1994), ‘Towards a New Economics of Science’, Research Policy, 23, 
487-532. 
David P. (1985), “Clio and the economics of QWERTY”, American Economic Review, 75, 2. 
David P. (1993), ‘Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb.Patents,Copyrights 
and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History’ in Wallerstein M. B., Mogee M. E., and 
Schoen R. A. (eds.),  Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and 
Technology, National Academy Press, Washington DC. 
David P.A. (2000), ‘The Digital Technology Boomerang: New Intellectual Property Rights 
Threaten “Open Science” ’, World Bank Conference Volume (forthcoming). 
David P.A. and Foray D. (2002), ‘An Introduction to the Economy of the Knowledge Society’, 
International Social Science Journal, 54, 171, 9-23. 
Fels A (1994),  Compact Discs. Intellectual Porperty Rights and Competition Policy, 
DAFFE/CLP(94)18, OECD, Paris. 
Foray D. (1989), “Les modéles de compétition technologique: une revue de la litterature”, 
Revue d’économie industrielle, 48. Giovanni B. Ramello, Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace 
 
19 
Frank R.H. e P.J. Cook (1995), The winner-take-all society, Free Press, New York. 
Geertz C. (1973),  The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York. 
Goldstein P. (1994), Copyright's Highway, Hill and Wang, New York. 
Gordon W. J. e Bone R.G. (1999), ‘Copyright’,  in Bouckaert B. e De Gest. G. (eds), 
Enciclopedia of Law and Economics, Elgar, Cheltenham-Northampton. 
Griffiths P. (1994), Modern Music. A Concise History, Thames and Hudson, London: 
Hodgson G.M. (1988), Economics and Institutions, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Hong H. (2000), ‘Marx and Menger on value: as many similarities as difference’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 24, 87-105. 
Isaac R.M. e Walker J.M. (1998), ‘Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision 
of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence’, Experimental Economics, 1, 191-206. 
Jha R. (1998), Modern Public Economics, Routledge, London. 
Jones R.H. (1990), ‘The Myth Of The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, Pace Law 
Review, 10, 3, 551-607. 
Landes W.M. e Posner R.A. (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’, Journal of 
Legal Studies, 18, 325.  
Lessig L. (2001), The Future of Ideas, Random House, New York. 
Levin R.C., Klevorick A.K., Nelson R.R. e Winter S.G. (1987), ‘Appropriating the returns from 
industrial research and development’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3, 783-820. 
Marvasti A. (2000), ‘Motion Picture Industry: Economies of Scale and Trade’, International 
Journal of the Economics of Business, 7, 1, pagg. 99-114. 
Mauss M. (1979), Sociology and Psicology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Metaxas-Maranghidis G. (ed, 1995), Intellectual Property Laws of Europe,Wiley, Chichester.  
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1994), The supply of recorded music, HMSO, London. 
OECD (1995),  Annex to the Summary Record of the 66
th Meeting of theCommittee on 
Competition Law and Policy, Mini  –Roundtable on Compact Disks. Intellectual Property 
Rights and Competition Policy, DAFFE/CLP/M(94)2/ANN2, OECD, Paris. 
Patterson L.R. (1968),  Copyright in Historical Perspective,  Vanderbilt University Press, 
Nashville  
Ramello G.B. (2003), ‘Copyright and Antitrust Issues’, in Gordon W. E Watt R. (eds), The 
Economics of Copyright: Developments in Research and Analysis, Elgar, Cheltenham-
Northampton. 
Ramello G.B. (2004 forthcoming), ‘Intellectual Property and the Market of Ideas’, in Backhaus 
J. (ed) Elgar Companion in Law and Economis, Second Edition, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-
Northampton.  
Rushton M. (1998), ‘The Moral Rights of Artists: Droit Moral ou Droit Pécuniare ?’, Journal of 
Cultural Economics, 22, 15-32. 
Ryan M.P.(1998), Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual 
Property, Brookings Institutions Press, Washington D.C. 
Scotchmer S. (1998), ‘Incentives to Innovate’, in Newman P. (ed.),  The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, London. 
Schumpeter J. (1943), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Unwin University, London. Liuc Papers n. 141,febbraio 2004 
 
20 
Silva F. e Ramello G. (2000), ‘Sound Recording Market: the Ambiguous Case of Copyright and 
Piracy’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 9, 3, 415-442. 
Silva F. e Ramello G. (1999), Dal vinile a Internet: Economia della Musica  tra Tecnologia e 
Diritti, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, Torino.  
Siwek S.E. (2002), Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy. The 2002 Report, International 
Intellectual Property Alliance, Washington DC. 
Solow R. (1957), ‘Technical Change and The Aggregate Production Function’,  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 39, 312-320. 
Strowel A. (1993), Droit d’auteur et copyright, Bruylant, Bruxelles e L.G.D.J., Paris. 
Tollison R. D. e Congleton R. D. (eds) (1995), The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, Elgar, 
Aldershot.  
Towse R.(1996),  Economics of Artists’ Labour Markets, ACE Research, Report N.3, Arts 
Council of England, London. 
Towse R. (1999), ‘Incentivi e redditi degli artisti derivanti dal diritto d’autore e diritti connessi 
nell’industria musicale’, in Silva F. e Ramello G. (1999).  
Varian H.R. (1992
3), Microeconomic Analysis, Norton & C., New York. 






 Università Carlo Cattaneo – LIUC, Castellanza, Italy. Contact: gramello@liuc.it  
Forthcoming in  Josselin J.J. and Marciano A. (eds) Law and the State.  A Political Economy 
Approach, Elgar. I am grateful to Juergen Backhaus, Christian Barrère, Bruno Frey ,  Sophie Harnay, 
Simon Luechinger, Jean-Michelle Josselin, Alain Marciano, Antonio Nicita, Ahmed Silem, Francesco 
Silva, Frank Stephen and Michael Wolgemuth  for the helpful remarks and comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1
 See for example Goldstein (1994) and Ramello (2004). 
2
 The discussion that follows applies without distinction to both the copyright of common law systems 
and to author's rights and neighbouring rights, its juridical equivalent in civil law systems. Although 
not all observers agree in considering these two legal institutions to be equivalent, the generalisation 
does not invalidate the arguments for this economic analysis. And it is also true that the various 
national laws have been tending to significantly converge, under the thrust of endogenous market 
forces--i.e. growing internationalisation and integration (see Goldstein, 1994; Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, 1994).  Strowel draws an interesting critical parallel (1993, p. 658), which 
underlines the evolutionary dialectic between these two juridical systems and notes how elements of 
each can be detected in the other. 
3
 Since 1996, for example, the category of copyright protected goods occupies first place in the United 
States balance of trade (see <http://www.iipa.com/> and Siwek, 2000). 
4
 This does not, of course, rule out any extra-economic reasons. 
5
  We recall that copyright does not protect ideas in the abstract, but only their fixing in a tangible 
medium, in other words the "expression of an idea" (see Bently and Sherman, 2001). This peculiarity 
will be examined subsequently; whereas for the purposes of the present economic  discussion, the 
term "ideas" shall be understood to also denote their expressions. 
6
 Note how this is not the only possible solution for overcoming the market failure in the case of public 
goods. For an overview of the alternatives, see for example Jha (1998, ch. 4). 
7
 See among many others, Arrow (1962), Landes and Posner (1989) and, for a rapid overview, Audretsch 
(1997).  
8
 However this hypothesis is not substantiated. And on the contrary, experimental economics has found 
that, in many cases, public goods are produced even where the predictions of non-cooperative 
equilibrium would indicate the opposite (Isaac and Walker, 1998).  
9
 See for example Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987, p.816)  
10
 However the hypothesis has not been clearly verified.   
11
 Scotchmer (1998, p. 273) also maintains that “patents are a very crude incentive mechanism with many 
pernicious side effects”. 
12
 Communication theorists would more correctly replace the term ‘use-value’ with ‘symbolic exchange-
value’, when speaking of the dynamics of social relationships (Baudrillard, 1972). For the sake of 
simplicity, we shall here continue to define the term use-value as denoting all those socially and 
individually-determined values that cannot be described in purely monetary terms. 
13
 The dichotomy between these values, which has inspired impassioned pages in the history of economic 
thought, can be traced back to the classical tradition, that we shall not be discussing here. The central 
idea, already put forward by both Marx and Menger (see Hong, 2000), is that value is not a natural 
property of goods, but rather exists in the social domain, in the sense that it is defined by relationships 
between human beings. Now, such relationships can be economic, in which case they generate an 
exchange-value, but they can also extend far beyond the purely economic sphere  (and in this, for 
example, we diverge from the strict Marxian interpretation).  
In the cultural sphere at least, and with all due respect to absolute proponents of neoclassical positions,  
the existence of values that are not purely economic has been verified by anthropological and 
sociological studies (beginning with Boas, 1938 )   
14
 On the shared and social nature of knowledge, see Geertz (1973). 
15





 See Ramello (2003).  
17
To further clarify this idea, consider the possibility of producing electrical energy using either a green 
technology or a highly polluting but cheaper method. An entrepreneur faced with a long-term decision 
will obviously not consider the negative externalities, and prefer the more profitable but polluting 
technology, unless of course the structure of private costs is altered by some form of public 
intervention. 
18
 It is no coincidence that one of the first cases of on-line copyright protection arose precisely in this 
sphere:  Playboy Enters v. Chuckleberry Publ., Inc. 939 F.  Supp.  1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),  recons. 
Denied, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9865 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
19
 This can be said to apply, for example, in the Western scientific community, in which fame, the respect 
of colleagues and so forth often take precedence over financial considerations, in the utility functions 
of academics (Dasgupta and David, 1994). 
20
 In point of fact, the tastes and preferences of individuals are not exogenous, as neoclassical theory 
would frequently have it, but endogenofus (Hodgson, 1988, pp. 13-sgg).  
21
  Moral rights, which originated in civil law jurisprudence, have today also been incorporated into 
common law systems. They protect the right of publication, the right of integrity and the right of 
paternity (Bently and Sherman, 2001). 
22
 They take the form of a bundle of rights for each possible form of economic exploitation (right of 
reproduction, right of distribution, etc. ; Bently and Sherman, 2001). 
23
 See for example Rushton (1998) and Strowel (1993). In the US doctrine of work-made-for-hire, for 
example, the employer is considered to be the author and hence acquires all the rights, in defiance of 
the concept of an intimate bond between creator and work.  
24
 This observation is borne out by empirical evidence (see Towse, 1996 and 1999). 
25
 The same opinion is expressed in David (1993) and Strowel (1993). 
26
 On the possibility of undue manipulation of authorship see Strowel (1993, p.668(: "[...] it is well-known 
that, under the banner of author's rights, publishers have from the outset sought to pursue their own 
interests, with increasing success the more they are able to officially lay claim to prerogatives on 
behalf of creators... and have these transferred to them by contract". 
27
 David (1993) concurs with this view, for the case of patent. 
28
Magil case, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission of the European Communities (C-241/91 P e C-
242/91P,  April 6, 1995); COMP D3/38.044. IMS Health v. NDC Health, European Commission, 
3/7/2001, COMP D3/38.O44 
29
 For an in-depth discussion see Silva and Ramello (2000) and Ramello (2003). 
30
 This is borne out by empirical surveys on copyright revenues (Towse, 1996 and 1999). 
31
  As we can see, therefore, certain investments have the two-fold consequence of reducing the 
replaceability of certain ideas while at the same time elevating barriers to entry.  
32 
See for example, Marvasti (2000) for the film industry and Silva and Ramello (2000) for the recording 
industry. 
33
 For a presentation of the principal-agent model see Varian (1992
3, Chap. 25).  
34
 See Scotchmer (1998). 
35
 Altbach (1996, p.18) indirectly responds to this question: “It is time to take a step back from rampant 
commercialism to examine the complex world of copyright and the distribution of knowledge. There 
is, in reality, a difference between a Mickey Mouse watch, a Hollywood film, or even a computer 
software program, on the one hand, and a scientific treatise, on the other […]Those who control the 
distribution of knowledge treat all intellectual property equally and are perfectly happy to deny access 
to anyone who cannot pay”. 
36
 For example Besen (1998, p.479) says: “  The fixation requirement serves the obvious purpose of 
defining the scope of the claimed  protection in objective terms ”. 
37
 Confirming this, the American musicologist Paul Griffiths (1994, p.9) speaking of the French composer 
Claude Debussy, said: “As for colour, Debussy was a master of delicate orchestral shadings, and 
pioneer in consistently making instrumentation an essential feature of composition. […] Thus the 
orchestration has its part in establishing both ideas and structure; its more than an ornament or a 





 It is one thing to grant a patent to an electrical lighting system, but a very different one to say instead 
that the patent protects the idea of a light bulb, or of a carbon filament light bulb, etc. Clearly, the 
scope sets the bounds of competition. 
39
 Considering that an intellectual work is created in vita,  its total revenues (in vita + post mortem) will 
have a duration of at least 100 years.  